THE DAILY MISINFORMER: Bioterror article pins trade magazine
"While nuclear or radiological weapons require a significant capital and physical investment to develop, 'in today’s genomic world, students with microscopes have the potential to develop biological weapons,' said [Jay Cohen, undersecretary of the Department of Homeland Security’s science and technology division] in an interview," wrote National Defense magazine here "[I]t’s the possibility of a biological attack that keeps him up at night," it is said.
Cohen is a retired rear admiral with no discernible background in the study of bioterror. He does have a background in showing up before Congress and at security trade conventions testifying and sermonizing on the always present need to buy new gadgets for the defense of the homeland.
In any case, in today's "genomic world," to steal a phrase, it does take a good bit more than a microscope to make a bioweapon, no matter the rank of the person making the claim.
However, longtime readers of the blog of your friendly neighborhood GlobalSecurity.Org Senior Fellow know that not knowing much when it comes to bioterror and terrorists is no obstacle to being taken seriously as an expert on the subject.
In fact, it is ofen a boost since it makes it easier to have no qualms when dropping quotes helpful in getting others frightened enough to pay attention to your requests for more money.
The students-can-make-biological-weapons meme surfaces regularly. Most recently, we dealt with the subject here while examing the cliche, often repeated in newspaper stories, that biodoom is inevitable.
The meme comes out the bioterror defense lobby. Functionally, it allows the counter-terror experts selling it to walk away from anything logical and moderate in risk assessment.
The future bioterror agent, custom-made by students or loners, provides a fresh new platter of unverified, theoretical enemies. This is much better than having to actually find out about things like what terrorists are actually doing and what materials have been found in their possession.
Further on in National Defense's article on biodefense, another so-called expert is furnished to talk about anthrax. She immediately hangs herself. Or the reporter and editor goof big time, although they seem not to know they have done so.
"The Japanese terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, known for releasing sarin nerve gas in a Japanese subway, tried seven times to release anthrax from the top of a building and failed because the conditions were wrong, [Barbara Billauer] said," informs ND.
Except, it is reasonably well known that Aum Shinrikyo never had a pathogenic strain of anthrax. What the group had in 1992 was a vaccine strain used in animal prophylaxis. No manner of altering "conditions" would have made it sicken people. (See here for a multitude of references.)
National Defense magazine published the quote as part of a larger discussion in which Billauer, an adjunct law professor, talks about details in the weaponization of anthrax.
"Even if a terrorist wanted to spread diseases such as anthrax ... Billauer explained that anthrax for example, has to float between three and five feet off the ground to be ingested by humans, otherwise it falls to the ground and dies," wrote the magazine, publishing another amusingly boneheaded mistake. (We'll leave it to the reader to figure out this one, which is fairly obvious.)
" 'You add ‘clay’ to [anthrax] to keep it airborne,' but it’s difficult to get the formula exactly right, [Billauer] said."
What is difficult to get exactly right, at least for this article, were basic facts about Aum Shinrikyo and anthrax. And while lay readers might not be expected to know such details, when one cannot get even these correct, it simply rips the guts right out of any other discussion which attempts to build on an authoritative voice.
Was there even a minimum of fact-checking at National Defense? Nope, sure doesn't look like it.
Tip o' the hat to Armchair Generalist for the attention-getting post.
"While nuclear or radiological weapons require a significant capital and physical investment to develop, 'in today’s genomic world, students with microscopes have the potential to develop biological weapons,' said [Jay Cohen, undersecretary of the Department of Homeland Security’s science and technology division] in an interview," wrote National Defense magazine here "[I]t’s the possibility of a biological attack that keeps him up at night," it is said.
Cohen is a retired rear admiral with no discernible background in the study of bioterror. He does have a background in showing up before Congress and at security trade conventions testifying and sermonizing on the always present need to buy new gadgets for the defense of the homeland.
In any case, in today's "genomic world," to steal a phrase, it does take a good bit more than a microscope to make a bioweapon, no matter the rank of the person making the claim.
However, longtime readers of the blog of your friendly neighborhood GlobalSecurity.Org Senior Fellow know that not knowing much when it comes to bioterror and terrorists is no obstacle to being taken seriously as an expert on the subject.
In fact, it is ofen a boost since it makes it easier to have no qualms when dropping quotes helpful in getting others frightened enough to pay attention to your requests for more money.
The students-can-make-biological-weapons meme surfaces regularly. Most recently, we dealt with the subject here while examing the cliche, often repeated in newspaper stories, that biodoom is inevitable.
The meme comes out the bioterror defense lobby. Functionally, it allows the counter-terror experts selling it to walk away from anything logical and moderate in risk assessment.
The future bioterror agent, custom-made by students or loners, provides a fresh new platter of unverified, theoretical enemies. This is much better than having to actually find out about things like what terrorists are actually doing and what materials have been found in their possession.
Further on in National Defense's article on biodefense, another so-called expert is furnished to talk about anthrax. She immediately hangs herself. Or the reporter and editor goof big time, although they seem not to know they have done so.
"The Japanese terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, known for releasing sarin nerve gas in a Japanese subway, tried seven times to release anthrax from the top of a building and failed because the conditions were wrong, [Barbara Billauer] said," informs ND.
Except, it is reasonably well known that Aum Shinrikyo never had a pathogenic strain of anthrax. What the group had in 1992 was a vaccine strain used in animal prophylaxis. No manner of altering "conditions" would have made it sicken people. (See here for a multitude of references.)
National Defense magazine published the quote as part of a larger discussion in which Billauer, an adjunct law professor, talks about details in the weaponization of anthrax.
"Even if a terrorist wanted to spread diseases such as anthrax ... Billauer explained that anthrax for example, has to float between three and five feet off the ground to be ingested by humans, otherwise it falls to the ground and dies," wrote the magazine, publishing another amusingly boneheaded mistake. (We'll leave it to the reader to figure out this one, which is fairly obvious.)
" 'You add ‘clay’ to [anthrax] to keep it airborne,' but it’s difficult to get the formula exactly right, [Billauer] said."
What is difficult to get exactly right, at least for this article, were basic facts about Aum Shinrikyo and anthrax. And while lay readers might not be expected to know such details, when one cannot get even these correct, it simply rips the guts right out of any other discussion which attempts to build on an authoritative voice.
Was there even a minimum of fact-checking at National Defense? Nope, sure doesn't look like it.
Tip o' the hat to Armchair Generalist for the attention-getting post.
posted by George Smith at 1:15 PM
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