FUTURE TO BE DANGEROUS: We should make some changes, sez essay by Army men
"Learning From Our Modern Wars: The imperatives of preparing for a dangerous future," by Peter Chiarelli and Stephen Smith (no relation) of the US Army, appears in the Sept-Oct issue of the Military Review here.
The authors recommend changing the ways of the military and the nation in advance of future troubles. It's worth a read not only for what the authors say but for what they can't quite bring themselves to say, too.
One of the more important points the authors try to address is the level of commitment which the nation brings (and will have to bring in the future) to its wars of choice.
The authors do not refer to future conflicts as wars of choice. They view them as wars of necessity spawned from a complex and dangerous world.
"Some might seek to avoid the hard choices complexity entails by concluding we are ill-suited to employ our national power in such multi-dimensional environments," they write.
"They would argue that we cannot afford to intervene in another Iraq. But this argument is like those made against entering into another of Europe's wars after the experience of World War I: While tempting it is unrealistic and invites risk."
However, writing from history and comparing Iraq to WWI or WWII? That doesn't fly for me. World War I, for example, left an entire generation decimated in England, France and Germany. The United States in Iraq has nothing on Verdun and The Battle of the Somme, two of the most dreadful -- perhaps THE most dreadful -- battles in human history.
This brings us to another point in the essay.
"Our current problems raise the legitimate question of whether the US ... can successfully prosecute an extended war without a true national commitment," it reads (page 4).
"History is replete with examples of countries that tried to fight wars in the absence of popular support and without committing their national resources. These countries often found themselves defeated on battlefields far from home."
The authors avoid mentioning the draft, a most rock solid example of national commitment.
Let DD come at the problem from a different angle, one using an example from yesterday's sports results.
"Navy sinks Notre Dame, 46-44," reads the LA Times. "It's over. After 44 years and three overtimes."
Navy beat crappy Notre Dame, a 1-8 team whose only victory came over another doormat, UCLA.
Week after week, the best college football teams -- the best college sports teams -- are not those of the service academies. If a service academy football team wishes to qualify for even a second or third tier bowl game after six wins, it has to schedule soft and hope for some luck.
The service academies attract good people. But they're certainly not regularly competitive with any common bigtime university college football squad. In fact, they are uncompetitive in any area of endeavor they share with the big American university system. The statistics say the best and the brightest don't see warfighting and nation-building after an invasion as part of their future.
Why?
It's a good metaphor for the lack of commitment to the war in Iraq, theoretical future conflicts, or "small wars." In the US, the working "commitment" is: "Include me out! You go do it and see that I'm not bothered."
No one makes a case for national commitment. Instead, they go in exactly the opposite direction as fast as possible.
DD watches college football on TV every Saturday. One sees hundreds of thousands in stadiums across the country. There's no evidence of a national commitment to warfighting and struggle. If there is any commitment, it's one that asks not to be inconvenienced in the pursuit of weekend entertainments.
You know, dammit, the difference between the US warfighting effort in World War II --as opposed to now and in the future -- was just on television in Ken Burns' "The War."
So if warfighting in a dangerous world will be critical to the future of the nation, one of the ways to ensure positive change is to put machinery in motion that will make everyone consider their commitment to any war effort. In fact, such machinery must be put in place or the problem of attaining national commitment cannot be solved.
The only way to do this is the draft. The draft is now a social and political taboo. As such, "Learning From Our Modern Wars" doesn't deal with it. (Using the Adobe reader, there are zero instances of the word "draft" in the .pdf file.)
Heck, even when some politician -- David Obey (D - Wisconsin) -- tries to get a war tax enacted, a sure way to get some small measure of national commitment to seep into the populace, it's struck down in a trice.
One can't mount a convincing argument about national commitment for the underwriting of success in present and future wars without coming to grips with the fact that the system has been made so that the average citizen is insulated from having to make even a slight choice about levels of such commitment.
And since the average citizen has no virtually no say in the conduct of the war, anyway, or -- more importantly -- whether we even choose to get into one or stay out, the nation's leadership exhibits a regular moral and intellectual bankruptcy in its demands on when and how wars should be prosecuted.
What if there was a requirement for a national plebiscite prior to engaging in a war of choice?
"Perhaps the most decisive factor that will determine who emerges victorious in current and future wars is which side can gain a consistent advantage in the holistic information environment that plays out ... near and far from the front lines," the authors continue.
"Perception has a nagging tendency of how our enemies, our allies and our own societies view war, often regardless of what is actually happening on the ground. If we are unable to do a better job than our enemies of influencing the world's perception, than even the most brilliantly conceived campaign plans will be unlikely to succeed."
In effect, the US military's use of the media and Internet to get out its message is busted, argue the authors.
"To address this situation, we must develop solutions for improving media access to the battlefield and to our activities without compromising the media's independence or our operational security."
One totally agrees. It is an excellent suggestion.
"Time and again, the military in Iraq under Gen. Petraeus ... has aligned itself with the most extreme right-wing blogs and plainly partisan 'journalists,' and has either excluded or expressed outright hostility towards everyone else," wrote Glenn Greenwald at Salon recently. (Greenwald's article reveals quite an eyeful here.)
"Learning From Our Modern Wars: The imperatives of preparing for a dangerous future," by Peter Chiarelli and Stephen Smith (no relation) of the US Army, appears in the Sept-Oct issue of the Military Review here.
The authors recommend changing the ways of the military and the nation in advance of future troubles. It's worth a read not only for what the authors say but for what they can't quite bring themselves to say, too.
One of the more important points the authors try to address is the level of commitment which the nation brings (and will have to bring in the future) to its wars of choice.
The authors do not refer to future conflicts as wars of choice. They view them as wars of necessity spawned from a complex and dangerous world.
"Some might seek to avoid the hard choices complexity entails by concluding we are ill-suited to employ our national power in such multi-dimensional environments," they write.
"They would argue that we cannot afford to intervene in another Iraq. But this argument is like those made against entering into another of Europe's wars after the experience of World War I: While tempting it is unrealistic and invites risk."
However, writing from history and comparing Iraq to WWI or WWII? That doesn't fly for me. World War I, for example, left an entire generation decimated in England, France and Germany. The United States in Iraq has nothing on Verdun and The Battle of the Somme, two of the most dreadful -- perhaps THE most dreadful -- battles in human history.
This brings us to another point in the essay.
"Our current problems raise the legitimate question of whether the US ... can successfully prosecute an extended war without a true national commitment," it reads (page 4).
"History is replete with examples of countries that tried to fight wars in the absence of popular support and without committing their national resources. These countries often found themselves defeated on battlefields far from home."
The authors avoid mentioning the draft, a most rock solid example of national commitment.
Let DD come at the problem from a different angle, one using an example from yesterday's sports results.
"Navy sinks Notre Dame, 46-44," reads the LA Times. "It's over. After 44 years and three overtimes."
Navy beat crappy Notre Dame, a 1-8 team whose only victory came over another doormat, UCLA.
Week after week, the best college football teams -- the best college sports teams -- are not those of the service academies. If a service academy football team wishes to qualify for even a second or third tier bowl game after six wins, it has to schedule soft and hope for some luck.
The service academies attract good people. But they're certainly not regularly competitive with any common bigtime university college football squad. In fact, they are uncompetitive in any area of endeavor they share with the big American university system. The statistics say the best and the brightest don't see warfighting and nation-building after an invasion as part of their future.
Why?
It's a good metaphor for the lack of commitment to the war in Iraq, theoretical future conflicts, or "small wars." In the US, the working "commitment" is: "Include me out! You go do it and see that I'm not bothered."
No one makes a case for national commitment. Instead, they go in exactly the opposite direction as fast as possible.
DD watches college football on TV every Saturday. One sees hundreds of thousands in stadiums across the country. There's no evidence of a national commitment to warfighting and struggle. If there is any commitment, it's one that asks not to be inconvenienced in the pursuit of weekend entertainments.
You know, dammit, the difference between the US warfighting effort in World War II --as opposed to now and in the future -- was just on television in Ken Burns' "The War."
So if warfighting in a dangerous world will be critical to the future of the nation, one of the ways to ensure positive change is to put machinery in motion that will make everyone consider their commitment to any war effort. In fact, such machinery must be put in place or the problem of attaining national commitment cannot be solved.
The only way to do this is the draft. The draft is now a social and political taboo. As such, "Learning From Our Modern Wars" doesn't deal with it. (Using the Adobe reader, there are zero instances of the word "draft" in the .pdf file.)
Heck, even when some politician -- David Obey (D - Wisconsin) -- tries to get a war tax enacted, a sure way to get some small measure of national commitment to seep into the populace, it's struck down in a trice.
One can't mount a convincing argument about national commitment for the underwriting of success in present and future wars without coming to grips with the fact that the system has been made so that the average citizen is insulated from having to make even a slight choice about levels of such commitment.
And since the average citizen has no virtually no say in the conduct of the war, anyway, or -- more importantly -- whether we even choose to get into one or stay out, the nation's leadership exhibits a regular moral and intellectual bankruptcy in its demands on when and how wars should be prosecuted.
What if there was a requirement for a national plebiscite prior to engaging in a war of choice?
"Perhaps the most decisive factor that will determine who emerges victorious in current and future wars is which side can gain a consistent advantage in the holistic information environment that plays out ... near and far from the front lines," the authors continue.
"Perception has a nagging tendency of how our enemies, our allies and our own societies view war, often regardless of what is actually happening on the ground. If we are unable to do a better job than our enemies of influencing the world's perception, than even the most brilliantly conceived campaign plans will be unlikely to succeed."
In effect, the US military's use of the media and Internet to get out its message is busted, argue the authors.
"To address this situation, we must develop solutions for improving media access to the battlefield and to our activities without compromising the media's independence or our operational security."
One totally agrees. It is an excellent suggestion.
"Time and again, the military in Iraq under Gen. Petraeus ... has aligned itself with the most extreme right-wing blogs and plainly partisan 'journalists,' and has either excluded or expressed outright hostility towards everyone else," wrote Glenn Greenwald at Salon recently. (Greenwald's article reveals quite an eyeful here.)
posted by George Smith at 2:30 PM
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